On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from Spain by Delgado Rivero, Francisco José et al.
 Document de treball de l’IEB 2011/4 
Fiscal Federalism 
ON THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL TAX RATES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 
Francisco J. Delgado, Santiago Lago-Peñas, Matías Mayor 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2011/4 
 
ON THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL TAX RATES:  
NEW EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 
 
Francisco J. Delgado, Santiago Lago-Peñas, Matías Mayor 
 
 
 
 
The IEB research program in Fiscal Federalism aims at promoting research in the 
public finance issues that arise in decentralized countries. Special emphasis is put on 
applied research and on work that tries to shed light on policy-design issues. Research 
that is particularly policy-relevant from a Spanish perspective is given special 
consideration. Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of 
the program. The program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation and the IEB-
UB Chair in Fiscal Federalism funded by Fundación ICO, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
and Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics. 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Caixa Catalunya, Abertis, La Caixa, Gas 
Natural and Applus) support several research programs. 
 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here 
are those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2011/4 
ON THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL TAX RATES:  
NEW EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN* 
 
 
Francisco J. Delgado, Santiago Lago-Peñas, Matías Mayor 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper studies the determinants of local tax rates. For the two main local 
taxes in Spain - the property tax and the motor vehicle tax - we test the existence of tax 
mimicking, yardstick competition and political trends in a sample of 2,713 municipalities. 
Using different spatial models, the results support the hypothesis of tax mimicking, with 
coefficients over 0.40. We also show the relevance of political variables such as the 
ideology of the incumbents and political fragmentation. The fact that incumbents with 
weaker political support display stronger mimicking behaviour is interpreted as evidence in 
favour of yardstick competition. Finally, we find incumbents mimic neighbouring 
municipalities ruled by the same political party, confirming the political trends hypothesis. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  C31, H71, H77 
Keywords:  Local taxation, tax mimicking, yardstick competition, political trends  
 
 
Francisco J. Delgado  
Department of Economics 
University of Oviedo 
Avenida del Cristo s/n. 
33071 Oviedo  
España 
E-mail: fdelgado@uniovi.es  
Santiago Lago-Peñas  
REDE, IEB and 
University of Vigo 
Campus Universitario 
32004 Ourense  
España 
E-mail: slagop@uvigo.es 
 
Matías Mayor  
Department of Applied Economics 
University of Oviedo  
Avenida del Cristo s/n.  
33071 Oviedo  
España 
E-mail: mmayorf@uniovi.es  
 
                                                 
* We gratefully acknowledge a grant from Institut d´Economia de Barcelona (IEB, Research Grants Fiscal 
Federalism) and would especially like to thank its directors, Nuria Bosch and Albert Solé-Ollé. 
1. Introduction 
The setting of local tax rates is the result of a wide set of economic and political 
factors, both internal and external to the municipality. Among the external factors are 
changes in state or federal grants (Lago-Peñas, 2008), regional or national economic 
shocks (Castells et al, 2004), and tax choices made by neighbouring jurisdictions.  
This last factor is the main driving force of the recent literature on local tax 
setting. Empirical studies are usually based on spatial econometrics, where tax choices 
are represented as a function of choices made by other governments and a series of 
control variables.  
Most of those studies confirm the existence of interactions between 
municipalities in terms of tax policy. Several explanations for tax mimicking have been 
provided, including tax competition based on mobility (Tiebout, 1956; for a review see 
Wilson, 1999), spillovers (Hanes, 2002; Revelli, 2002; Lundberg, 2006; and Solé-Ollé, 
2006), and yardstick competition (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995). Political 
yardstick competition is founded on the idea that voters are “rationally ignorant” and 
use information from other jurisdictions to judge the performance of their own 
incumbents. Fiscal choices made in nearby municipalities serve as benchmarks.  
More recently, Santolini (2008, 2009) has introduced the idea of “social 
interactions” in order to explain mimicking. Politicians belonging to the same party 
interact with each other - socially rather than strategically - to draw inferences about 
party preferences. This mechanism is based on previous work which explains common 
behavior in terms of a propensity to behave in the same way as a reference group 
(Redoano, 2007). The main reference group for politicians is their own political party 
(Geys and Vermeir, 2008a, b) because it aims to provide a common ideological 
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framework and discourse for its members and impose these on them (Rodden and 
Wibbels, 2005). 
This paper focuses on the strategic interactions in Spanish municipalities. Using 
a cross-section dataset for 2005 comprising 2,713 municipalities with populations of 
over 1,000, we test both yardstick competition and the existence of social interactions. 
We centre our attention on the two main local taxes in Spain - property tax and motor 
vehicle tax - which jointly represent 66% of local tax revenue.  
Our research is of interest for three different reasons. First, Spain is an 
interesting case study as it is a highly decentralized country, with 17 regional 
governments and 8,112 municipalities managing 35.8% and 13.4% of total public 
expenditure respectively.1 According to the Regional Authority Index2 computed by 
Hooghe et al (2010), on the basis of data for 2005 Spain is placed sixth after Germany, 
Belgium, USA, Canada and Italy. Second, we test the existence of tax mimicking, 
yardstick competition and political trends and provide an extensive review of the 
literature on these topics. Third, from a methodological standpoint we estimate spatial 
lag, spatial Durbin and two-regime spatial lag models, with several definitions of the 
weight matrix. Furthermore, following the proposal by LeSage and Pace (2009), we 
compute the total, direct and indirect impacts of the explanatory variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related 
literature. In Section 3, the model and the econometric issues of estimation are 
discussed. In Section 4 we present the data and the main results of the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 concludes and offers possible extensions of this work. 
                                                 
1 Data for 2006 from the OECD biennial publication “Government at a Glance 2009.” The central 
government spends 22.4% and the remaining 28.5% corresponds to Social Security expenditure. In terms 
of the percentage of expenditure corresponding to central government, Spain has the third lowest share of 
the OECD countries, behind Switzerland with 14.8% and Germany with 19.1%. The OECD average was 
43.9%.     
2 Regional authority is measured across eight dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal 
autonomy, representation, law making, executive control, fiscal control and constitutional reform. 
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 2. Literature review 
Previous work on yardstick competition in local taxes and related topics is 
reported in Table 1.3 Since the seminal paper by Case (1993) for the United States, 
there has been an increasing interest in these topics, especially over the last five years. 
Bordignon et al (2004) showed that “yardstick competition theory is too weak to 
produce well-defined empirical predictions concerning the fiscal choices of 
neighbouring jurisdictions, and some of the possible theoretical solutions do not involve 
mimicking behaviour at all”. However, based on different methodological approaches, 
most empirical papers support the existence of comparative performance evaluation. 
Only one of the revised papers, Edmark and Agren (2008), does not confirm this cause 
of strategic interactions, while Bordignon et al (2003) and Santolini (2008) found partial 
evidence of yardstick competition. 
Studies on yardstick competition rely upon cross-section or panel data. Both 
kinds of datasets have advantages and drawbacks. Panel data allows controlling for 
unobserved fixed local specifications. On the other hand, the cross-section approach 
allows a large domain for the data and avoids the problems posed by structural changes 
in factors such as tax laws. Moreover, these studies are based on either a tax-reaction 
function or a vote-function framework. The former has been followed by Allers and 
Elhorst (2005), Dubois et al (2007), Edmark and Agren (2008), and Deskins and Hill 
(2010), while the vote function has been used by Solé-Ollé (2003), Vermeir and 
Heyndels (2006), Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007) or Dubois and Paty (2010). There are 
different ways to test the yardstick competition hypothesis (Elhorst and Fréret, 2009): i) 
                                                 
3 For surveys on strategic interactions, see Brueckner (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005) and Delgado and 
Mayor (2010). See also the study on tax innovation carried out by Ashworth et al (2006) focusing on the 
establishment of new taxes. With data from 17 EU countries over the period 1970-1999, Redoano (2007) 
confirms the yardstick competition hypothesis for income tax. 
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two-equation spatial lag model; ii) spatial lag model with cross-products; and iii) two-
regime spatial lag model. The first approach has been followed by Besley and Case 
(1995) and the second has been used by Case (1993), Schaltegger and Küttel (2002) and 
Solé-Ollé (2003), using an instrumental variables procedure. The third has been 
followed by Bordignon et al (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2005), both using maximum 
likelihood estimators.   
 The papers devoted to date to the Spanish case are Solé-Ollé (2003) and Bosch 
and Solé-Ollé (2007) for yardstick competition and Delgado and Mayor (2010) for tax 
mimicking. Solé-Ollé (2003) analysed several local taxes for 105 municipalities of the 
province of Barcelona with panel data corresponding to 1992-1999. He found that tax 
rates were higher with wider electoral margins, with leftist incumbents, and in non-
election years. Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007) studied the effective rates of the local 
property tax in 2,799 municipalities with data for the period 1991-2003. They showed 
the existence of comparative voting behaviour, whereby higher taxes translate into a 
loss of votes. Both of these papers used a spatial lag model with cross-products and 
estimated vote functions. Finally, Delgado and Mayor (2010) studied tax mimicking in 
the main local taxes in a sample of municipalities located at the northern Spanish region 
of Asturias. They estimated both spatial lag and spatial error models for the tax reaction 
functions and their empirical evidence partially supports the existence of tax mimicking.  
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Table 1: Survey of literature on local yardstick competition and related topics (taxation) 
Study Socio-economic and 
demographic variables 
Political  
variables 
Weight matrixes and 
Estimation procedure 
Main results 
Case (1993) 
United States (States) 
Income tax 
Panel data, 1979-1988 
Population 
Black, elderly, young 
population 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants 
Unemployment rate 
Party 
 
Contiguity matrix 
Tax reaction function 
Instrumental variables 
 
Yes. 
Besley and Case (1995) 
United States (States) 
Several taxes (sales, 
income and corporate) 
Panel data, 1960-1988 
Young population (5-17) 
Elderly population (65+) 
Per capita income 
Unemployment rate 
Debt 
Leader age Contiguity matrix 
Vote and tax reaction functions  
Instrumental variables and 
maximum likelihood 
Yes.  
Vote-seeking and tax-setting are tied 
together. 
Schaltegger and Küttel 
(2002) 
Switzerland 
Revenue 
26 cantons 
Panel data, 1980-1998 
Population 
Ratio of urban population 
Per capita income 
 
Ideology 
Coalition 
Fragmentation 
Autonomy 
Contiguity matrix 
Other W: similar population, income 
Tax reaction function 
 
Yes, but institutions of direct legislation 
and fiscal autonomy matter in the policy 
mimicking 
Bordignon et al. (2003)  
Italy (Milan) 
143 municipalities > 
4,000 inhabitants 
Property tax 
Cross-section, 2000 
Population 
Young population 
Elderly population 
Area 
Urbanization rate 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants  
Party 
Vote share 
Last election or re-election 
Election year 
Contiguity matrix 
Tax reaction function 
Maximum likelihood 
Yes, but partially 
Positive spatial autocorrelation in tax rates 
when mayors run for re-election. No 
interaction when mayors face a term limit 
or large majorities   
Solé-Ollé (2003) 
Spain (Barcelona) 
105 municipalities > 
5,000 inhabitants 
Several taxes 
Panel data, 1992-1999 
Population 
Per capita fiscal base 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants 
Party 
Electoral margin (% from 
50%) 
Ideology  
W: distance (20 km) 
Other W: size (population), 
economic, political 
Vote function 
Instrumental variables 
 
Yes. 
Tax rates are higher with bigger electoral 
margins, with leftist incumbents and in 
non-election years 
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Table 1: Survey of literature on yardstick competition and related topics (taxation) (cont.) 
Study Socio-economic and 
demographic variables 
Political variables Weight matrixes  
Estimation procedure 
Main results 
Allers and Elhorst (2005)  
Netherlands 
496 municipalities 
Property tax 
Cross section, 2002 
Population 
Low-income households rate 
Property value 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants 
Party 
Majority 
Contiguity matrix 
(also a matrix with large 
municipalities) 
Tax reaction function 
Maximum likelihood 
Yes. 
Voters penalize incumbents for 
anticipated tax rate differentials, but not 
for unanticipated 
Vermeir and Heyndels 
(2006)  
Belgium (Flanders) 
308 municipalities 
Income and property tax 
Panel data, 1988-2000 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita income 
Per capita expenditure 
(Tax rates) 
 
Prior vote share 
Number of government 
parties 
Contiguity matrix 
Vote function 
Instrumental variables 
 
Yes. 
Incumbents are punished for higher rates, 
more intensely with lower rates in 
neighbouring jurisdictions 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé 
(2007) 
Spain 
2,799 municipalities 
>1,000 inhabitants 
Property tax 
Panel data, 1991-2003 
Population 
Per capita unemployment 
 
 
Party 
Coalition 
First or following  
Based on pure proximity: 10, 20, 30 
and 40 km thresholds. They applied 
20 km threshold based on the fit 
results 
Vote function 
Instrumental variables 
Yes. 
Evidence of “comparative voting 
behaviour” (a tax increase bigger than the 
others municipalities has an important 
vote loss)  
Dubois et al (2007) 
France 
93 departments 
Business tax 
Cross-section, 1999 
Population 
Old people 
Area 
Urbanization rate 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita grants 
Per capita income 
Electoral margin 
Political proximity 
Ideology 
Contiguity matrix 
Tax reaction function 
Maximum likelihood 
More evidence of partisan government 
than Leviathan government hypothesis  
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Table 1: Survey of literature on yardstick competition and related topics (taxation) (cont.) 
Study Socio-economic and 
demographic variables 
Political variables Weight matrixes  
Estimation procedure 
Main results 
Fiva and Rattso (2007) 
Norway 
301 municipalities 
Property tax 
Cross section, 2001 
Population 
Children (0-5) 
Young population (6-15) 
Elderly population (+67) 
Rural (share pop at rural 
areas) 
Income distribution 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants 
Political fragmentation  
Party 
 
Contiguity matrix 
Estimation: spatial model with 
discrete dependent variable; spatial 
latent variable approach (Bayesian) 
Yes. 
Importance of political factors: more 
socialists in the council and more party 
fragmentation are associated with higher 
propensity to have property tax 
Edmark and Agren (2008)  
Sweden 
283 municipalities 
Income tax 
Panel data, 1993-2006 
 
Population 
Young population (0-15) 
Elderly population (65+, 75+) 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants 
Party 
Majority 
Election year 
Contiguity matrix 
Tax reaction function 
Instrumental variables 
No. 
Similar interaction between weak and 
strong majority, and in election years    
Santolini (2008) 
Italy (Marche region) 
246 municipalities 
Property tax 
Cross section, 1994 
Population 
Elderly population (65+) 
Area 
Coast situation 
Per capita income 
Per capita grants 
Electoral distance (% vote 
until 100%) 
Coalition 
Majorities 
Election year 
Contiguity matrix with same 
coalition/party 
Two spatial autocorrelation regimes 
and three spatial regimes to 
distinguish between election year 
and non election year 
Spatial lag model introducing a 
spillover variable 
Yes, but partially: 
Yes, regarding right-wing coalitions 
No, between small and large majorities 
No, in election years 
Political trends 
Dubois and Paty (2010) 
France 
104 municipalities > 
50,000 inhabitants 
Housing tax 
Panel data, 1989-2001 
Tax rate 
 
Vote share previous 
national election 
Vote share previous local 
election 
Prime Minister´s popularity 
Years as mayor 
Public positions in the past 
Re-election 
W1: Geographical (belong to the 
same urban area, 1/dij) 
W2: Geographical and 
demographical (nearby cities where 
population is >50.000 inhab., 1/dij) 
Vote function 
Instrumental variable 
Yes. 
The relevant neighbours are the economic 
ones –similar population- and not the 
geographical ones –belong to the same 
urban area-. 
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 Table 1: Survey of literature on yardstick competition and related topics (taxation) (cont.) 
Study Socio-economic and 
demographic variables 
Political variables Weight matrixes  
Estimation procedure 
Main results 
Deskins and Hill (2010) 
United States 
States 
Personal income tax and 
sales tax  
Panel data, 1978-2006 
Population density 
Median income 
College education 
Unemployment rate 
Age 25-44 population 
Age 45-64 population 
Elderly population (65+) 
Party 
Election year         
W1: Contiguity matrix 
W2: Contiguity and relative 
populations  
W3: Distances 
Tax reaction function 
Temporal perspective: the responsiveness 
of one state of the tax policy of the 
neighbouring states may change over time 
Source: own elaboration 
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3. The model and estimation procedure 
To test the tax mimicking hypothesis the first step is to define the tax-setting 
function. This function is then estimated using both a spatial lag model and a spatial 
Durbin model. 
The spatial lag model follows the expression:  
T = ρWT + αP + βX + ε        (1) 
where T is the tax vector, P is a vector of political variables, X is the vector of control 
variables that includes a set of socioeconomic factors, and W is the weight matrix. 
In the tax competition literature, the dominant specification strategy is the so-
called “specific-to-general” strategy, based on the result of the Lagrange Multiplier test 
and its robust version (Florax et al. 2003). However, a recent paper by Mur and Angulo 
(2009) shows that the “general-to-specific” strategy seems to be more robust to the 
existence of anomalies in the Data Generating Process. Hence, they proposed a more 
complex model as a starting point, such as the Spatial Durbin Model. From an economic 
point of view, Lesage and Pace (2009) and Elhorst (2010) draw on the contribution of 
Manski (1993), who pointed out that three different interaction effects may explain the 
spatial pattern of an economic phenomenon: an endogenous interaction effect, an 
exogenous interaction effect and a correlated effect. These authors assert that the best 
strategy to test for spatial interaction effects is to start with the most general model, e.g. 
the Manski model. In order to avoid parameter identification problems, Lesage and Pace 
(2009) propose the exclusion of the spatially autocorrelated error term and specify the 
Spatial Durbin Model.4 
The spatial Durbin model extends equation (1) by including the exogenous 
interaction effect through the spatially lagged independent variables (WX and WP): 
                                                 
4 If the spatial dependence in the dependent variable or independent variable is ignored, the estimator of 
the coefficients is biased and inconsistent. On the other hand, the omission of the spatially autocorrelated 
error term only causes a loss of efficiency. 
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 T = ρWT + αP + βX + α´WP + β´WX + ε     (2) 
In order to test for yardstick competition, the third step is to define a spatial lag 
model with two regimes represented by a dummy variable (D). When the focus is on the 
majorities, D is coded 1 if the corresponding incumbent enjoys a strong majority, 
defined as a vote share of 50% or more,5 and 0 otherwise. B is a diagonal matrix ( ) 
with diagonal elements equal to 1 when D=1 and (I-B) is its complementary matrix with 
diagonal elements equal to 1 when D=0. BWT is the average tax rate of the contiguous 
municipalities with strong majorities while (I-B)WT is the average tax rate of the 
contiguous municipalities without strong majorities. 
n n×
 T = ρD=1BWT + ρ’D=0(I-B)WT +μD=1 + μ´D=0 + αP + βX + ε        (3) 
where the parameters ρD=1 and ρ’D=0 measure the intensity of the tax interaction of 
municipalities belonging to the first and the second regimes respectively. If fiscal policy 
interaction is driven by yardstick competition, we expect the interaction coefficient ρD=1  
to be significantly smaller than the interaction coefficient ρ’D=0. Different political 
regimes may also set different taxes regardless of the explanatory variables and the tax 
mimicking behavior. Two different intercepts (μD=1 and μ´D=0) are therefore included in 
the model to capture this. A similar approach is followed when we study the effect of 
ideology.  
The matrix W is defined according to several alternative criteria. First, we 
consider the contiguity matrix as a benchmark. Second, we use the k-nearest neighbour 
approximation with k= 4, 5, and 6, presenting the results with the k=4 alternative. The 
results are similar but we choose this matrix to control for the number of neighbours and 
the estimation problem caused by a too dense spatial weight matrix. Third, we define a 
matrix based on distance, concretely a distance less than 20 km (as in Solé-Ollé, 2003). 
                                                 
5 Percentages of 60% and 70% were also considered as thresholds. 
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Finally, the political trend hypothesis is defined by Santolini (2008) as follows: 
“the incumbent politician mimics the tax rates of neighbouring jurisdictions governed 
by politicians belonging to the same party”. Hence, we estimate a spatial lag model 
considering the tax interactions between contiguous municipalities with incumbents 
controlled by the same political party. This is achieved by analysing the spatial 
parameter (ρ) using a W coded 1 when jurisdictions i and j are neighbours and are ruled 
by the same political party, and 0 otherwise. 
There are four different methods for estimating models that include spatial 
interactions: maximum likelihood (ML), instrumental variables (IV), Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) and the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo6 (MCMC).  
In the 1980s and 1990s one of the problems of this last method was its computational 
cost but nowadays this has been solved. IV and GMM methods are less computationally 
burdensome and they do not rely on the normality assumption. However, these methods 
do not guarantee that the spatial coefficient estimates belong to its parameter space. In 
this case, the models described above are estimated by means of maximum likelihood 
(ML). 
Another issue is how the coefficients in a spatial regression model should be 
interpreted. In the spatial lag model, any change in the dependent variable for a single 
municipality may affect the dependent variable in all the other municipalities. A change 
in the value of a political or demographic variable associated with a municipality will 
affect the municipality’s own tax rate (direct effect) and if a spatial interaction exists it 
will also affect the tax rate of all other jurisdictions (indirect effect). This distinction is 
introduced by Lesage and Pace (2009). Furthermore, these effects are different in each 
                                                 
6 See Lesage and Pace (2009).  
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municipality so it is necessary to present an average value7 as proposed Lesage and 
Pace (2009)
                                                
.  
The direct impact shows the average response of the dependent variable to the 
independent variables, including feedback influences that arise from impacts passing 
through neighbours and back to the municipality itself.8 The indirect impact tackles the 
effect that any change in a jurisdiction has on others and how changes in all 
municipalities affect a given jurisdiction. 
 
4. Data and results 
4.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis is focused on the two main local taxes in Spain: the 
property tax and the motor vehicle tax. These account for 50% and 16% of local tax 
revenue respectively. With regard to the local property tax, we adopt two different 
indexes. The first is the nominal tax rate, which is freely chosen by municipalities 
within an interval defined in national laws. However, liabilities depend not only on tax 
rates but also on the value of real estate assigned by the Spanish cadastral office (the tax 
base). Insofar as periodical reassessments are made every ten years or more and at 
different dates in each municipality, real estate values tend to be significantly higher in 
those municipalities with the most recent reassessments. Hence, as a second index we 
use the amount per receipt as a proxy of the effective tax rate. Regarding the motor 
 
) 1I Wρ −−
( )or
7 The direct effect is measured by the average of the diagonal elements of the matrix (  times 
the coefficient β α
( ) 1I Wρ −−
)or
 of the corresponding variable and the indirect effect is measured by the average 
of either the row sums or the column sums of the non-diagonal elements of the matrix  times 
the coefficient ( α  of the corresponding variable. β
8 The main diagonal of higher-order spatial weight matrixes is non-zero, which allows us to collect these 
feedback effects.  
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vehicle tax, municipalities can increase the quotas established by the central government 
with a coefficient ranging from 1 to 2. We use this coefficient as the local tax choice. 
As explanatory variables, we consider the following: 
a) structural and socio-demographic features:  
• population (in thousands) 
• area (km2) 
• percentage of population under 15 years 
• percentage of population over 65 years 
• unemployment rate 
b) fiscal indicators: 
• per capita grants received 
c) political factors: 
• ideology. Two dummies are defined to capture ideological differences of 
incumbents. The first is coded 1 in the case of leftist governments and 0 
otherwise, while the second is coded 1 for rightist governments and 0 
otherwise. 
• electoral distance. In order to proxy political support enjoyed by 
incumbents and confidence in re-election, this variable is defined 
following Santolini (2008) as the difference between 100 and the share of 
the vote of the mayor’s political party. 
• political fragmentation. This is measured by the Herfindahl index, in line 
with Fiva and Rattso (2007). It is computed as the sum of the squares of 
the shares of each party’s councillors. Hence the index is 1 if one party 
has all the councillors. 
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All estimates use cross-section data from year 2005, a non-electoral year. Local 
elections in Spain are celebrated each four years in May (2003, 2007). The electoral 
data corresponds to the municipal elections celebrated in 2003. Data for all the control 
variables are available for 2005. Only Spanish municipalities over 1,000 inhabitants are 
included, so the sample contains 2,713 local governments.  
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics. Regarding the political variables, 
54% of local jurisdictions are ruled out by left-wing political parties and about 39.5% 
by rightist governments. The remaining municipalities are governed by centrist political 
parties or ideologically undefined local political parties. The average electoral distance 
is 46.25% and the mean political fragmentation is 0.44, with a range between 0.16 and 
19.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean S. D. Minimum Maximum 
  Dependent variable 
Property tax – nominal rate 0.6241 0.1635 0.3000 1.1600 
Property tax – per receipt amount 141.22 92.74 12.75 1040.25 
Motor vehicle tax rate 1.3020 0.2609 1.00 2.00 
  Explanatory variables 
Population (thousands) 12.998 77.23 1.002 3155.359 
Area 102.59 139.53 0.36 1752.61 
Share of population under 15 years  13.60 3.60 2.66 27.78 
Share of population over 65 years 20.37 7.59 3.03 49.36 
Unemployment rate 6.76 3.18 0.09 22.99 
Per capita grants received 399.40 303.70 100.58 5244.70 
Leftist incumbent 0.5396 - 0.00 1.00 
Rightist incumbent 0.3951 - 0.00 1.00 
Electoral distance 46.25 13.66 0.00 94.12 
Political fragmentation 0.4439 0.1104 0.1557 1.00 
Sources: Spanish Ministry of Economics and Public Finance, Spanish Home Office, Spanish Ministry of 
Public Administrations, Spanish Statistics Institute (INE). N= 2,713. 
 
                                                 
9 A value of 1, corresponding to cases where there is only one party in the council, occurs for only 10 
municipalities. 
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As a first test of the spatial pattern of the data, Moran statistics on dependent 
variables are reported in Table 3. The results corroborate the existence of positive 
spatial autocorrelation, which justifies our empirical approach. Spatial patterns seem to 
be similar when neighbours are defined by k-nearest neighbours and distance (20 km), 
but the contiguity-based results indicate lower spatial autocorrelation, and no 
autocorrelation in the per receipt amount in the property tax.   
 
Table 3: Moran statistics on tax choices 
 Property tax - 
Nominal rates 
Property tax - 
Per receipt 
amount 
Motor vehicle tax 
a) Contiguity 
Moran 
(z) 
b) k=4-n-n 
Moran 
(z) 
c) 20 km 
Moran 
(z) 
 
0.1286*** 
(4.35) 
 
0.4600*** 
(28.13) 
 
0.4364*** 
(41.13) 
 
-0.0037 
(-0.08) 
 
0.1266*** 
(7.81) 
 
0.1470*** 
(13.90) 
 
0.1783*** 
(6.02) 
 
0.4813*** 
(29.42) 
 
0.4714*** 
(44.43) 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
4.2 Results for the tax mimicking hypothesis 
The main results in relation to the tax mimicking hypothesis are reported in 
Tables 4 to 6. For the sake of brevity, we only show results with k-nearest neighbours 
with k=4. 
For the nominal tax rate of property tax (Table 4), the spatial coefficient is 
significant (0.48) and political variables matter. Leftist incumbents tend to choose 
higher rates. On the other hand, electoral distance and political fragmentation are not 
significant. The remaining variables do not appear to have a systematic effect on the tax 
rate, except for area and the share of elderly population. For the per receipt amount 
(Table 5), the spatial parameter is also significant but lower, at around 0.10. In this case, 
population, area and share of elderly population are significant. Regarding the political 
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variables, the dummies for both leftist and rightist incumbents are not significant but 
electoral distance and political fragmentation play an important role. 
In the case of the motor vehicle tax (Table 6), mimicking behaviour is confirmed 
and found to be strong, with a parameter ρ=0.43. Now, all of the control variables are 
significant except the proxy for young people and rightist governments. Again, leftist 
governments tend to set higher taxes. Electoral distance and political fragmentation, on 
the other hand, are negatively related to tax rates. 
In summary, the results show a positive and significant coefficient on the 
parameter ρ for both the property tax and the motor vehicle tax. Having confirmed tax 
mimicking, the following sub-sections explore the potential relevance of both yardstick 
competition and the political trends hypothesis, according to which there is a link 
between spatial interactions and some attributes of the political process. 
With regard to the so-called “flypaper effect”, the coefficients on per capita 
grants are negative and significant except for the nominal rates of property tax. 
Therefore, our estimates provide evidence in favour of the median voter model and 
reject the flypaper effect10. 
Once the coefficients are estimated, the impacts can be calculated based on the 
proposal of LeSage and Pace (2009) to decompose the total impact into direct and 
indirect impacts. As stated above, the first one reflects the impact of a one-unit change 
in the covariate on the dependent variable corresponding to the spatial unit 
(municipality) of interest. The second shows the impact of a one-unit change in the 
covariate on the dependent variable of first-order neighbours of the spatial unit of 
interest. Detailed results are reported in Tables 7 to 9.  
                                                 
10 See Boarnet and Glazer (2002) for an application to the US or Dahlberg et al (2008) for Sweden. 
 
17
If these models are estimated by OLS, the indirect impact of a change in one of 
the explanatory variables is set to zero. In the spatial lag model for the property tax rate, 
the indirect effect represents approximately a quarter of the direct effect for area, 
population over 65, leftist incumbent and political fragmentation. The magnitude of 
these effects increases when the spatial Durbin model is estimated and its interpretation 
is more difficult when the sign of the estimated coefficient of a variable is different 
from the sign of the coefficient of its spatial lag. In this model, for example, the indirect 
effect of the political fragmentation variable is 3.76 times the direct effect. 
It is not surprising that the indirect impacts in the spatial lag model of the per 
receipt amount are lower than the nominal tax rate. In this case, if one of the 
explanatory variables increases, the increase in the neighbouring jurisdictions is 
approximately 10% of the increase in the jurisdiction itself. 
Finally, the indirect effects in the spatial lag model for the motor vehicle tax are 
highly significant and represent approximately 15% of the direct impacts. Again, the 
interpretation of the Durbin model is more complex. On one hand, if the unemployment 
rate in a municipality increases, the motor vehicle tax increases (direct effect) but this 
tax is going to decrease in neighbouring municipalities. The average total effect of the 
unemployment rate is negative. On the other hand, the impacts of political 
fragmentation, for example, have the same sign and the indirect effect is 2.25 times 
greater than the direct effect. 
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Table 4: Results for property tax – nominal tax rate 
 
 Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin 
ρ 0.21835*** 
(284.77) 
0.47663*** 
(640.72) 
Population 0.000039 
(1.03) 
0.000042 
(1.21) 
Area 0.000044** 
(2.05) 
0.000070*** 
(3.44) 
Share of population under 15 years  0.000404 
(0.25) 
0.001657 
(1.00) 
Share of population over 65 years -0.00254*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.001367 
(-1.64) 
Unemployment rate -0.00318*** 
(-3.44) 
0.000724 
(0.61) 
Per capita grants received 0.000004 
(0.45) 
-0.000001 
(-0.09) 
Leftist incumbent 0.026003** 
(2.17) 
0.023367** 
(2.16) 
Rightist incumbent 0.013072 
(1.06) 
0.008663 
(0.78) 
Electoral distance 0.000255 
(0.57) 
0.000070 
(0.17) 
Political fragmentation -0.11138** 
(-1.99) 
-0.071973 
(-1.41) 
Lag Population  -0.000166** 
(-2.28) 
Lag Area  -0.000077** 
(-2.37) 
Lag Share of population under 15 years   -0.003179 
(-1.63) 
Lag Share of population over 65 years  -0.001806* 
(-1.78) 
Lag Unemployment rate  -0.002133 
(-1.47) 
Lag Per capita grants received  0.000001 
(0.02) 
Lag Leftist incumbent  -0.006425 
(-0.36) 
Lag Rightist incumbent  -0.017623 
(-0.97) 
Lag Electoral distance  -0.001351*** 
(-2.96) 
Lag Political fragmentation  -0.23672*** 
(-3.96) 
Log likelihood 1312.31 1517.60 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. K=4-nearest neighbours 
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Table 5: Results for property tax – per receipt amount 
 
 Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin 
ρ 0.10171*** 
(25.82) 
0.09422*** 
(16.78) 
Population 0.10888*** 
(4.91) 
0.095423*** 
(4.26) 
Area 0.023037* 
(1.83) 
0.039710*** 
(3.02) 
Share of population under 15 years  -0.02819 
(-0.03) 
1.4536 
(1.36) 
Share of population over  65 years -2.7493*** 
(-5.98) 
-2.0109*** 
(-3.73) 
Unemployment rate -1.2246** 
(-2.26) 
-1.2509 
(-1.63) 
Per capita grants received -0.01291** 
(-2.29) 
-0.0150*** 
(-1.79) 
Leftist incumbent 4.04640 
(0.58) 
6.0180 
(0.86) 
Rightist incumbent 4.1736 
(0.58) 
5.1532 
(0.72) 
Electoral distance -0.69565*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.66491** 
(-2.53) 
Political fragmentation -151.01*** 
(-4.60) 
-140.59*** 
(-4.27) 
Lag Population  0.24342*** 
(5.12) 
Lag Area  -0.08315*** 
(-3.96) 
Lag Share of population under 15 years   -1.2089 
(-0.96) 
Lag Share of population above 65 years  -0.04023 
(-0.06) 
Lag Unemployment rate  0.79528 
(0.84) 
Lag Per capita grants received  -0.00333 
(-0.34) 
Lag Leftist incumbent  2.8453 
(0.25) 
Lag Rightist incumbent  0.67400 
(0.06) 
Lag Electoral distance  0.32844 
(1.12) 
Lag Political fragmentation   -1.8410 
(-0.05) 
Log likelihood -15963.10 -15941.62 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. K=4-nearest neighbours 
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 Table 6: Results for motor vehicle tax 
 
 Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin 
ρ 0.14036*** 
(185.29) 
0.43023*** 
(519.69) 
Population 0.000391*** 
(6.98) 
0.000301*** 
(5.94) 
Area 0.000148*** 
(4.67) 
0.000217*** 
(7.25) 
Share of population under 15 years  0.000277 
(0.12) 
-0.000194 
(-0.08) 
Share of population over 65 years -0.008873*** 
(-7.63) 
-0.005826*** 
(-4.73) 
Unemployment rate -0.007825*** 
(-5.71) 
0.004785*** 
(2.74) 
Per capita grants received -0.000062*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.000062*** 
(-4.83) 
Leftist incumbent 0.060429*** 
(3.40) 
0.060068*** 
(3.77) 
Rightist incumbent 0.018425 
(1.01) 
0.026232 
(1.60) 
Electoral distance -0.001657** 
(-2.49) 
-0.001170* 
(-1.95) 
Political fragmentation -0.48798*** 
(-5.87) 
-0.33815*** 
(-4.50) 
Lag Population  0.000066 
(0.61) 
Lag Area  -0.000189*** 
(-3.96) 
Lag Share of population under 15 years   0.001551 
(0.53) 
Lag Share of population over 65 years  0.000058 
(0.04) 
Lag Unemployment rate  -0.012208*** 
(-5.71) 
Lag Per capita grants received  -0.000005 
(-0.25) 
Lag Leftist incumbent  -0.035930 
(-1.36) 
Lag Rightist incumbent  -0.007062*** 
(-2.63) 
Lag Electoral distance  -0.003828*** 
(-5.63) 
Lag Political fragmentation  -0.48088*** 
(-5.44) 
Log likelihood 257.80 491.03 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. K=4-nearest neighbours 
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Table 7: Impacts for property tax – nominal tax rate 
 
 Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Population 0.000040 
(1.01) 
0.000010 
(1.01) 
0.000050 
(1.01) 
0.000014 
(0.33) 
-0.00025 
(-2.02)** 
-0.00024 
(-1.64) 
Area 0.000045 
(2.08)** 
0.000012 
(2.05)** 
0.000056 
(2.08)** 
0.000061 
(2.85)*** 
-0.00007 
(-1.39) 
-0.00001 
(-0.22) 
Share of population under 15 years  0.000410 
(0.26) 
0.000106 
(0.26) 
0.000516 
(0.25) 
0.001201 
(0.77) 
-0.00411 
(-1.33) 
-0.00291 
(-0.76) 
Share of population over 65 years -0.00258 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.00067 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.00324 
(-3.24)*** 
-0.00184 
(-2.19**) 
-0.00423 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.00606 
() 
Unemployment rate -0.00323 
(-3.34)*** 
-0.00084 
(-3.23) 
-0.00407 
(-3.34)*** 
0.000382 
(0.35) 
-0.00308 
(-1.58) 
-0.00269 
(-1.33) 
Per capita grants received 0.000004 
(0.43) 
0.000001 
(0.43) 
0.000005 
(0.42) 
-0.000001 
(-0.92) 
-0.000001 
(-0.04) 
-0.000002 
(-0.06) 
Leftist incumbent 0.026417 
(2.23)** 
0.006851 
(2.20)** 
0.033267 
(2.23)** 
0.024267 
(2.02)** 
0.008106 
(0.26) 
0.032373 
(0.83) 
Rightist incumbent 0.013280 
(1.06) 
0.003444 
(1.05) 
0.016724 
(1.06) 
0.006087 
(0.52) 
-0.023207 
(-0.67) 
-0.017121 
(-0.39) 
Electoral distance 0.000259 
(0.59) 
0.000067 
(0.59) 
0.000327 
(0.58) 
-0.000183 
(-0.41) 
-0.002267 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.002450 
(-2.11)** 
Political fragmentation -0.11315 
(-2.00)** 
-0.02934 
(-1.98)** 
-0.14249 
(-2.00)** 
-0.123716 
(-2.21)** 
-0.466099 
(-4.20)*** 
-0.589815 
(-4.03)*** 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. K=4-nearest neighbours 
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Table 8: Impacts for property tax – per receipt amount 
 
 Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Population 0.109239 
(4.99)*** 
0.011969 
(3.41)*** 
0.121209 
(4.99)*** 
0.102981 
(4.62)*** 
0.271111 
(5.40)*** 
0.374093 
(6.83)*** 
Area 0.023113 
(1.81)* 
0.002533 
(1.65)* 
0.025645 
(1.81)* 
0.037332 
(2.79)*** 
-0.08529 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.04796 
(-2.02)** 
Share of population under 15 years  -0.02828 
(-0.03) 
-0.00310 
(-0.02) 
-0.03138 
(-0.02) 
1.421532 
(1.36) 
-1.15130 
(-0.85) 
0.270236 
(0.21) 
Share of population over 65 years -2.75837 
(-5.95)*** 
-0.30225 
(-3.92)*** 
-3.06062 
(-6.03)*** 
-2.01781 
(-3.73)*** 
-0.24671 
(-0.33) 
-2.26452 
(-3.08)*** 
Unemployment rate -1.22868 
(-2.22)** 
-0.13463 
(-1.97)** 
-1.36331 
(-2.22)** 
-1.23066 
(-1.64) 
0.727598 
(0.79) 
-0.50306 
(-0.66) 
Per capita grants received -0.01295 
(-2.32)** 
-0.00142 
(-2.07)** 
-0.01437 
(-2.32)** 
-0.01028 
(-1.82)* 
-0.00460 
(-0.45) 
-0.01488 
(-1.24) 
Leftist incumbent 4.059285 
(0.54) 
0.444796 
(0.53) 
4.504081 
(0.54) 
6.120164 
(0.88) 
3.665071 
(0.32) 
9.785235 
(0.69) 
Rightist incumbent 4.187352 
(0.52) 
0.458829 
(0.52) 
4.646181 
(0.52) 
5.187941 
(0.74) 
1.245403 
(0.14) 
6.433344 
(0.47) 
Electoral distance -0.69795 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.07648 
(-2.25)** 
-0.77442 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.65696 
(-2.50)** 
0.285482 
(0.87) 
-0.37147 
(-0.91) 
Political fragmentation -151.505 
(-4.62)*** 
-16.6011 
(-3.19)*** 
-168.1063 
(-4.59)*** 
-141.042 
(-4.30)*** 
-16.2043 
(-0.42) 
-157.247 
(-2.95)*** 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. K=4-nearest neighbours 
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 Table 9: Impacts for motor vehicle tax 
 
 Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Population 0.000393 
(6.88)*** 
0.000061 
(6.50)*** 
0.000455 
(6.95)*** 
0.000334 
(6.09)*** 
0.000311 
(1.79)* 
0.000645 
(3.18)*** 
Area 0.000149 
(4.94)*** 
0.000023 
(4.56)*** 
0.000173 
(4.93)*** 
0.000201 
(6.46)*** 
-0.00015 
(-2.01)** 
0.00005 
(0.58) 
Share of population under 15 years  0.000279 
(0.07) 
0.000043 
(0.05) 
0.000322 
(0.07) 
0.000048 
(0.06) 
0.002334 
(0.54) 
0.002382 
(0.49) 
Share of population over 65 years -0.00893 
(-7.55)*** 
-0.00139 
(-6.42)*** 
-0.01032 
(-7.52)*** 
-0.00623 
(-4.94)*** 
-0.00389 
(-1.80)* 
-0.01012 
(-3.86)*** 
Unemployment rate -0.00787 
(-5.47)*** 
-0.00123 
(-4.63)*** 
-0.00910 
(-5.39)*** 
0.003111 
(1.87)* 
-0.01614 
(-5.77)*** 
-0.01303 
(-4.56)*** 
Per capita grants received -0.00006 
(-4.74)*** 
-0.00001 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.00007 
(-4.77)*** 
-0.00007 
(-4.84)*** 
-0.00005 
(-1.48) 
-0.00012 
(-2.78)*** 
Leftist incumbent 0.060813 
(3.05)*** 
0.009483 
(2.99)*** 
0.070296 
(3.05)*** 
0.058404 
(3.39)*** 
-0.01604 
(-0.36) 
0.042363 
(0.82) 
Rightist incumbent 0.018542 
(0.87) 
0.002891 
(0.87) 
0.021434 
(0.87) 
0.016445 
(0.92) 
-0.09434 
(-2.17)** 
-0.07790 
(-1.45) 
Electoral distance -0.00167 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.00026 
(-2.51)** 
-0.00193 
(-2.57)*** 
-0.00188 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.00689 
(-5.60)*** 
-0.00877 
(-5.31)*** 
Political fragmentation -0.49108 
(-6.17)*** 
-0.07658 
(-5.62)*** 
-0.56766 
(-6.16)*** 
-0.44148 
(-5.41)*** 
-0.99602 
(-6.42)*** 
-1.43749 
(-7.05)*** 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. K=4-nearest neighbours 
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4.3 Evidence on yardstick competition 
In order to explain tax interactions between municipalities, yardstick competition is 
the mechanism most often invoked. In short, voters judge their incumbents by 
comparing their fiscal policies with those implemented in neighbouring municipalities. 
The yardstick competition mechanism predicts that governments supported by a large 
majority mimic neighbouring tax rates to a lesser extent than governments in precarious 
majority or minority. The strategy followed in our paper relies on the use of the two-
regime spatial lag model to test for the existence of significant differences in the spatial 
interaction parameters under both regimes. To do so, we define a new variable, 
Majority, which is coded 1 if the mayor’s political party share is above 50% (strong 
majority) and 0 otherwise (weak majority).11 This latter category includes minority 
cabinets and coalition cabinets. Another dimension of the hypothesis, namely the impact 
of the ideology, is also tested with a two-regime spatial lag model.  
As reported in Table 10, the differences between the estimations which control 
for majorities are significant, supporting the yardstick competition hypothesis. The gap 
between the spatial parameters is especially large in the case of the property tax when 
per receipt amount is considered.  
Leftist incumbents, in line with the results in the previous subsection, tend to 
choose higher tax rates. However, the interactions of the leftist incumbents are more 
intense for the motor vehicle tax and for the nominal rates of property tax, with the 
differences being significant.12 On the contrary, rightist incumbents interact to a lesser 
extent, with significant differences in the two taxes just mentioned.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Given the rules governing the local electoral system in Spain, 50% of the votes may correspond to 60% 
or more of councilors. Hence, results do not hold if other vote percentages (60% and 70%) are used. 
12 This is in contrast to Solé-Ollé (2003) for Catalonian municipalities, where the interaction of the left-
wing political parties was less intense. 
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Table 10: Yardstick competition hypothesis 
 
 Property tax - 
Nominal rates 
Property tax - 
Per receipt amount 
Motor vehicle tax 
ρtotal 
overall sample 
 
ρweak 
weak majority 
 
ρstrong 
strong majority 
 
difference 
(t-value) 
 
ρleft 
left-wing party  
 
ρno-left 
non-left party 
 
difference 
(t-value) 
 
ρright 
right-wing party 
 
ρno-right 
non-right party 
 
difference 
(t-value) 
0.21835*** 
 
 
0.258435 
(11.39)*** 
 
0.196064 
(12.06)*** 
 
0.062371 
(2.20)** 
 
0.240644 
(12.41)*** 
 
0.197393 
(10.93)*** 
 
0.043251 
(1.61)** 
 
0.184760*** 
(9.54) 
 
0.246634*** 
(13.66) 
 
-0.061874** 
(2.31) 
0.10171*** 
 
 
0.243375 
(6.53)*** 
 
0.019252 
(0.74) 
 
0.224123 
(4.67)*** 
 
0.096064 
(3.23)*** 
 
0.108124 
(3.49)*** 
 
-0.012060 
(0.27) 
 
0.098389*** 
(2.90) 
 
0.103909*** 
(3.76) 
 
-0.005520 
(0.12) 
0.14036*** 
 
 
0.181017 
(10.51)*** 
 
0.116274 
(9.18)*** 
 
0.064743 
(3.05)*** 
 
0.169247 
(11.12)*** 
 
0.114270 
(8.30)*** 
 
0.054977 
(2.70)*** 
 
0.102130*** 
(6.94) 
 
0.173469*** 
(12.21) 
 
-0.071339*** 
(3.52) 
***, ** and *, significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. k=4-nearest neighbours. Spatial lag model 
 
 
 
4.4 The political trends hypothesis 
As stated above, to test this hypothesis we follow the proposal of Santolini 
(2008). The estimated spatial parameter reflects to what extent a 1% increase in a 
neighbouring jurisdiction’s tax rate ruled by the same party increases the municipality’s 
own rate. Table 11 reports the estimations for the case of leftist and rightist incumbents.  
We observe a significant, although rather limited, fiscal interaction in both leftist 
and rightist incumbents. The several estimates of ρ indicate that tax interaction between 
neighbouring left-wing governments is stronger for the motor vehicle tax (ρ=0.062), but 
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we observe the opposite result for the nominal rates of the property tax in the case of 
rightist incumbents (ρ=0.089). When the focus is on the per receipt amount of the 
property tax the interactions according to ideology are similar, with ρ=0.04 in each 
case. Our results are in contrast to those of Santolini (2008) who found only partial 
evidence of political trends for Italian municipalities, the mechanism being significant 
for only right-wing (ρ=0.61) and Christian Democrat (ρ=0.037) parties. 
 
Table 11: Political trends hypothesis (ρ) 
 
 Property tax - 
Nominal rates 
Property tax - 
Per receipt amount 
Motor vehicle tax 
Left-wing 
 
Right-wing 
 
0.0659*** 
(62.59) 
0.0890*** 
(42.12) 
0.0389*** 
(48.03) 
0.0399*** 
(34.66) 
0.0620*** 
(60.47) 
0.0259*** 
(27.77) 
*** Significant at 1%. k=4-nearest neighbours 
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have studied the determinants of local tax rates using cross-section data for 
2,713 Spanish municipalities with over 1,000 inhabitants. Our analysis was developed 
in three steps. First, the existence of tax mimicking behaviours through spatial lag and 
spatial Durbin models was tested. The results confirm that municipalities mimic the 
neighbouring tax rates, yielding a parameter over 0.4 in the case of the nominal property 
tax rate and the motor vehicle tax. Several socioeconomic variables such as population, 
area and the share of elderly population were statistically significant. The results for the 
effect of grants tend to support the median voter theorem instead of the flypaper effect 
hypothesis. Regarding the political variables, leftist incumbents choose higher tax rates, 
while electoral distance and political fragmentation are negatively related with rates. 
Direct and indirect effects of the explanatory variables on tax rates are also estimated. 
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Second, two-regime spatial lag models were implemented in order to test the 
yardstick competition hypothesis. Our results support this hypothesis and show that 
mimicking behaviour is weaker when incumbents enjoy the support of a stronger 
majority (50% or over). With regard to ideology, we observe that the tax interaction is 
more intense for leftist governments. 
Finally, we have explored the political trends hypothesis. A spatial lag model 
was estimated where neighbourhood was qualified by political party affinity between 
incumbents. The estimated spatial parameters confirm this hypothesis for the cases of 
both leftist and rightist incumbents.  
This paper can be extended in several directions. In particular, we aim to explore 
alternative and innovative definitions of the W matrix, such as the municipal quality of 
life, and to introduce the urban or rural nature of the jurisdictions into estimates.   
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